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The fraction of newly-originated mortgages that are of the adjustable-rate (ARM) versus the fixed-rate
(FRM) type exhibits a surprising amount of time variation. A simple utility framework of mortgage
choice points to the bond risk premium as theoretical determinant: when the bond risk premium is
high, FRM payments are high, making ARMs more attractive. We confirm empirically that the bulk
of the time variation in household mortgage choice can be explained by time variation in the bond
risk premium. This is true regardless of whether bond risk premia are measured using forecasters' data,
a VAR term structure model, or a simple rule-of-thumb based on adaptive expectations. This simple
rule-of-thumb moves in lock-step with mortgage choice, thereby lending further credibility to a theory
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svnieuwe@stern.nyu.eduOne of the most important ﬁnancial decisions any household has to make during its lifetime is
whether to own a house and, if so, how to ﬁnance it. There are two broad categories of housing
ﬁnance: adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) and ﬁxed-rate mortgages (FRMs). Figure 1 plots the
share of newly-originated mortgages that is of the ARM-type in the US economy between January
1985 and June 2006. This ARM share shows a surprisingly large variation; it varies between 10%
and 70% over time. This paper seeks to explain this variation in households’ mortgage choice.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Our premise is that the time variation in the ARM share is driven by time variation in bond
risk premia, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the long-term interest rate and the expected future
short-term interest rates. By now there is abundant evidence that the expectations hypothesis of
the term structure of interest rates fails to hold empirically.1 Time variation in bond risk premia
aﬀects the FRM rate, which is linked to the long-term interest rate, but not the ARM rate. A
simple utility framework formalizes that when the risk premium on long-term bonds is high, the
expected payments on the FRM are large relative to those on the ARM, making the ARM more
attractive.
Empirically we test this prediction using three alternative methods to determine expected future
short rates, which are needed to compute the bond risk premium: (i) using professional forecasters’
data, (ii) constructing a term-structure model, and (iii) employing an adaptive expectations scheme
that uses a short history of short rates. We show that a large fraction of the time variation in the
ARM share can be attributed to time variation in bond risk premia. All three measures deliver the
same economic eﬀect: a one standard deviation increase in bond risk premia increases the ARM
share by 8%.
Figure 2 illustrates our main result. It plots the ARM share (solid line, measured against the
left axis) alongside the ﬁve-year bond risk premium (dashed line, measured against the right axis).
We construct the bond risk premium as the diﬀerence between the ﬁve-year nominal Treasury
bond yield and the forecasters’ consensus expectation about the average nominal one-year rate
over the next ﬁve years. The nominal yield data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
and forecaster data from Blue Chip. The correlation between the two series is 64%.
[Figure 2 about here.]
In Section 1, we formalize the utility-based mortgage choice argument. The model extends the
work of Campbell (2006) by allowing for time variation in bond risk premia. It strips out some of
1Fama and French (1989), Campbell and Shiller (1991), Dai and Singleton (2002), Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005),
Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005), and Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2006), among others, document
and study time variation in bond risk premia.
1the rich life-cycle dynamics of Cocco (2005) and Campbell and Cocco (2003) in order to focus on
the role of time-varying risk premia. Risk-averse borrowers not only care about expected mortgage
payments, but also about the variability of these payments. The ARM payments vary with the
real short rate, while the presence of inﬂation uncertainty makes the real FRM payments variable.
This analysis points to three term structure determinants of mortgage choice: (i) the nominal risk
premium, (ii) the variability of the real rate, and (iii) the variability of expected inﬂation.
In Section 2, we turn to the data, and regress the ARM share on various measures of the nominal
bond risk premium. The ﬁrst such analysis is based on the forecasters’ data shown in Figure 2
(Section 2.2). Section 2.3 develops a vector auto-regressive (VAR) term structure model, which
provides a second way to compute expectations of future nominal interest rates. In addition, the
VAR framework provides a way to compute the variability of the real rate and expected inﬂation.
The VAR-based bond risk premium is strongly related to the ARM share, and the variability of
the real rate and the expected inﬂation enter with the sign predicted by the model.
Section 2.4 considers a third way to measure the bond risk premium, which we label the rule-
of-thumb. This rule-of-thumb approximates the theoretical bond risk premium, which contains
forward-looking expectations of future short rates, as the diﬀerence between the current long-term
nominal interest rate and a backward-looking average of nominal short rates. Our motivation for
this simple rule is a suspicion that households may not have the required ﬁnancial sophistication to
solve complex investment problems (Campbell (2006)).2 This proxy for bond risk premia is much
easier to compute; it only requires calculation of an average short rate over the recent past. Yet,
it captures the dynamics of the bond risk premia that we extract from the VAR model. Figure
3 displays the ARM share alongside the rule-of-thumb for ﬁve-year bond risk premia, which uses
three years of past short rate data. The ﬁgure documents a striking co-movement between the
ARM share (solid line, left axis) and the rule-of-thumb for bond risk premia (dashed line, right
axis), and suggests that making a close-to-optimal mortgage choice may be within reach of the
average household.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Section 2.5 studies predictors of the ARM share proposed in the literature, such as the slope
of the yield curve, the spread between an FRM rate and an ARM rate, or the long yield. In
our empirical work, we ﬁnd lower explanatory power for these variables than for the bond risk
premium. Our model suggests an explanation for the yield spread and the long yield. The yield
spread not only measures the nominal bond risk premium but also deviations of expected future
2One branch of the real estate ﬁnance literature documents slow prepayment behavior (e.g., Schwartz and Torous
(1989), Stanton (1995), Boudoukh, Whitelaw, Richardson, and Stanton (1997), and Schwartz (2007)). Other relevant
papers in real estate are Brunnermeier and Julliard (2006), who study the eﬀect of money illusion on house prices,
and Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2006), who study limits to arbitrage in mortgage-backed securities
markets.
2nominal short rates from the current nominal short rate. Intuitively, it ignores the rollover aspect
of an ARM mortgage: its interest rate resets when the short-term interest rate changes. The VAR
model shows that the two components of the yield spread are negatively correlated. When expected
inﬂation is high, the inﬂation risk premium tends to be high as well. At the same time, expected
future short rates are below the current short rate because inﬂation is expected to revert back to
its long-term mean. Hence, the correlation is negative. Likewise, the long yield only measures the
expected payments on the FRM, but does not account for the expected payments on the ARM,
the expected future short rates. From a theoretical perspective, the yield spread and the long yield
are imperfect predictors of mortgage choice, which is conﬁrmed empirically.
While our three measures of the bond risk premium deliver similar results over the full sample,
their performance diverges in the last ten years of the sample. This is mostly due to the increase
in the ARM share in 2003-04, which is predicted correctly by the rule-of-thumb measure, but not
by the other two forward-looking measures of the bond risk premium. Section 3 explains this
divergence. Part of the explanation lies in product innovation in the ARM mortgage segment. But
most of the divergence is due to large forecast errors in future short rates in this episode. This
motivates us to consider the inﬂation risk premium component of the nominal risk premium, for
which any forecast error that is common to nominal and real rates cancels out. We construct the
inﬂation risk premium using real yield (TIPS) data and either Blue Chip forecasters’ data or a VAR
model for inﬂation expectations, and show that both measures have a strong positive correlation
with the ARM share and deliver a similar economic eﬀect.
In Section 4, we study the robustness of these results. First, we analyze the impact of the
prepayment option, which is typically embedded in US FRM contracts, on the utility diﬀerence
between the ARM and FRM.3 We show that the prepayment option reduces the exposures to the
underlying risk factors. However, it continues to hold that higher bond risk premia favor ARMs.
In sum, we ﬁnd that the presence of the option does not materially alter the results. Second, we
show that the bond risk premium is also an important explanatory variable in a large cross-section
of loan-level data. The loan-level analysis also allows us to investigate the importance of measures
of ﬁnancial constraints, such as the loan-to-value ratio or the FICO credit score. While they are
statistically signiﬁcant predictors of mortgage choice, they do not add much to the explanatory
power of the bond risk premium, nor signiﬁcantly reduce it. Third, we discuss statistical inference,
and conduct a bootstrap exercise to calculate standard errors. Finally, we discuss liquidity issues
in the TIPS markets and how they may aﬀect our results on the inﬂation risk premium. We use
real interest rate data generated by the term structure model of Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007) as
an alternative to the TIPS data, and show that our results strengthen. We conclude that bond
risk premia are a robust determinant of mortgage choice.
3We contribute to the large literature on rational prepayment models, e.g., Dunn and McConnell (1981), Stanton
and Wallace (1998), Longstaﬀ (2005), and Pliska (2006), by adding time variation in risk premia.
3Our ﬁndings resonate with recent work in the portfolio literature by Brandt and Santa-Clara
(2006), Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003), Sangvinatsos and Wachter (2005), and Koijen, Nij-
man, and Werker (2007). This literature emphasizes that forming portfolios that take into account
time-varying risk premia can substantially improve performance for long-term investors.4 Because
the mortgage is a key component of the typical household’s portfolio, and because an ARM exposes
that portfolio to diﬀerent interest rate risk than an FRM, choosing the wrong mortgage may have
adverse welfare consequences (Campbell and Cocco (2003) and Van Hemert (2006)). In contrast to
these studies, our exercise suggests that mortgage choice is an important ﬁnancial decision where
the use of bond risk premia is not only valuable from a normative point of view. Time variation
in risk premia is also important from a positive point of view, to explain observed variation in
mortgage choice.
Finally, our paper also relates to the corporate ﬁnance literature on the timing of capital
structure decisions. The ﬁrm’s problem of maturity choice of debt is akin to the household’s choice
between an ARM and an FRM. Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003) show that ﬁrms are able
to time bond markets. The maturity of debt decreases in periods of high bond risk premia.5 Our
ﬁndings suggest that households also have the ability to incorporate information on bond risk
premia in their long-term ﬁnancing decision.
1 Determinants of Mortgage Choice
This section explores the choice between a ﬁxed-rate mortgage (FRM) and an adjustable-rate
mortgage (ARM) in a simple theoretical model. Rather than developing a full-ﬂedged life-cycle
model, our focus is on the role of bond risk premia in a tractable two-period analytical framework.
The model we consider can be viewed as an extension of Campbell (2006). In Section 1.1, we set
up the individual’s mortgage choice problem. Section 1.2 discusses how bond prices are set, and
Section 1.3 how mortgage rates are determined. Section 1.4 works out the risk-return tradeoﬀ that
households face when choosing a mortgage.
1.1 The Household’s Problem
At time 0, the household purchases a house and uses a mortgage to ﬁnance it. The house has a
nominal value H$
t at time t. For simplicity, the loan is non-amortizing. We assume a loan-to-value
ratio equal to 100%, so that the mortgage balance is given by B = H$
0. The investment horizon
4Campbell and Viceira (2001) and Brennan and Xia (2002) derive the optimal portfolio strategy for long-term
investors in the presence of stochastic real interest rates and inﬂation, but assume risk premia to be constant.
5See Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2006) and Baker, Taliaferro, and Wurgler (2006) for a recent discussion. In
ongoing work, Greenwood and Vayanos (2007) study the the relationship between government bond supply and
excess bond returns.
4and the maturity of the mortgage contract equal 2 periods. Interest payments on the mortgage are
made at times 1 and 2. At time t = 2, the household sells the house at a price H$
2 and pays down
the mortgage. The household chooses to ﬁnance the house using either an ARM or an FRM, with
associated nominal interest rates qi, i ∈ {ARM,FRM}. In each period, the household receives
nominal income L$
t.
We postulate that the household is borrowing constrained: In each period, she consumes what is
left over from the income she receives after making the mortgage payment (equation (2)). Because
the constrained household cannot invest in the bond market, she cannot undo the position taken
in the mortgage market.6 Terminal consumption equals income after the mortgage payment plus
the diﬀerence between the value of the house and the mortgage balance (equation (3)).
The household maximizes lifetime utility over real consumption streams {C/Π}, where Π is the
price index and Π0 = 1. Preferences in (1) are of the CARA type with risk aversion parameter γ,

































2 − B, (3)
We assume that real labor income, Lt = L$
t/Πt, is stochastic and persistent:





In addition, we assume that the real house value is constant and let Ht = H$
t /Πt.8
1.2 Bond Pricing
The one-period nominal short rate at time t, y$




t(1) = yt(1) + xt. (4)
6We can extend the model to allow for saving in one-period bonds. For realism, we then impose borrowing
constraints along the lines of the life-cycle literature (Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005)).
7This transformation is reminiscent of an Epstein and Zin (1989) aggregator which introduces a small preference
for early resolution of uncertainty (see also Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006)). While this modiﬁcation is
made for analytical convenience, it implies that β does not aﬀect mortgage choice. In Section 4.2, we investigate the
role of the subjective discount rate in a power utility framework and show that the risk-return tradeoﬀ is unaﬀected
for standard values of β.
8It would be straightforward to extend the model to stochastic real house prices and to allow for a temporary
and a permanent component in labor income, as in Campbell and Cocco (2003).
5Denote the corresponding price of the one-period nominal bond P $
t (1). Following Campbell and
Cocco (2003), we assume that realized inﬂation and expected inﬂation coincide:
πt+1 = logΠt+1 − logΠt = xt, (5)
so that there is no unexpected inﬂation risk.9 To accommodate the persistence in the real rate and
expected inﬂation, we model both processes to be ﬁrst-order autoregressive:
yt+1(1) = µy + ρy (yt(1) − µy) + σyε
y
t+1,
xt+1 = µx + ρx (xt − µx) + σxε
x
t+1.



















We assume that labor income risk is uncorrelated with real rate and expected inﬂation innovations,
an assumption that can be relaxed.
This structure delivers a familiar conditionally Gaussian term structure model. The important
innovation in this model relative to the literature on mortgage choice is that the market prices of























′. If we were to restrict the prices of risk to be aﬃne, our
model would fall in the class of aﬃne term structure models (see Dai and Singleton (2000)), but
no such restriction is necessary.

















with σ = [σy,σx]
′. This equation implies that the long rate equals the average expected future






























9Brennan and Xia (2002) show that the utility costs induced by incompleteness of the ﬁnancial market due to
unexpected inﬂation are small. In a previous version of this paper, we have done a numerical, multi-period mortgage
choice analysis. We found that unexpected inﬂation risk did not aﬀect the household’s risk-return tradeoﬀ in any
meaningful way.
6The long-term nominal bond risk premium φ$
0(2) contains the market price of risk λ0 and also
absorbs the Jensen correction term.10
1.3 Mortgage Pricing
A competitive fringe of mortgage lenders prices ARM and FRM contracts to maximize proﬁt,
taking as given the term structure of Treasury interest rates generated by M$.
Denote the ARM rate at time t by qARM
t . This is the rate applied to the mortgage payment





























−1 − 1 ≃ y
$
t(1).
Similarly, the zero-proﬁt condition for the FRM contract stipulates that the present discounted
































Per deﬁnition, the nominal interest rate on the FRM is ﬁxed for the duration of the contract. We
abstract from the prepayment option for now, but examine the role it plays in Section 4.1. The




1 − P $
0(2)
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The FRM rate is approximately equal to the two-period nominal bond rate.
Our setup embeds two assumptions that merit discussion. The ﬁrst assumption is that the
stochastic discount factor M$ that prices the term structure of interest rates is diﬀerent from
the inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution of the households in section 1.1. Without this
assumption, mortgage choice would be indeterminate.11 The second assumption is that we price
10Our nominal bond risk premium is the risk premium on a strategy that holds a τ-period bond until maturity
and ﬁnances it by rolling over the 1-year bond. This deﬁnition is diﬀerent from the one-period bond risk premium
in which the long-term bond is held for one period only. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2006) study various deﬁnitions of
bond risk premia, including ours.
11Any equilibrium model of the mortgage market requires a second group of unconstrained investors. Time
variation in risk premia could then arise from time-varying risk-sharing opportunities between the constrained and
the unconstrained agents, as in Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006). In their model, the unconstrained agents
price the assets at each date and state. Such an environment justiﬁes taking bond prices as given when studying
the problem of the constrained investors. Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006) consider agents with (identical)
7mortgages as derivatives contracts on the Treasury yield curve. Hence, the same sources that drive
time variation in the Treasury yield curve will govern time variation in mortgage rates.
1.4 The Risk-Return Tradeoﬀ
We now derive the optimal mortgage choice for the household of Section 1.1. The crucial diﬀerence
between an FRM investor and an ARM investor is that the former knows the value of all nominal
mortgage payments at time 0, while the latter knows the value of the nominal payments only
one period in advance. The risk-averse investor trades oﬀ lower expected payments on the ARM
against higher variability of the payments. Appendix A computes the life-time utility under the
ARM and the FRM contract. It shows that the investor prefers the ARM contract over the FRM





























































The left-hand side measures the diﬀerence in expected payments on the FRM and the ARM. All
else equal, a household prefers an ARM when the expected payments on the FRM are higher than
those on the ARM. Appendix A shows that the diﬀerence between the expected mortgage payments
on the FRM and ARM contracts approximately equals the two-period bond risk premium φ$
0(2).
This leads to the main empirical prediction of the model: the ARM share is positively related to
the nominal bond risk premium.
The right-hand side of (7) measures the risk in the payments, where we recall that γ controls
risk aversion. The ﬁrst line arises from the variability of the ARM payments, the second line
represents the variability of the FRM payments. All else equal, a risk-averse household prefers the
ARM when the payments on the ARM are less variable than those on the FRM. The risk in the
FRM contract is inﬂation risk (σ2
x). The balance and the interest payments erode with inﬂation.
We relabel expected inﬂation risk as V x. The risk in the ARM contract consists of three terms.
ARMs are risky because the nominal contract rate adjusts to the nominal short rate each period.
The variance of the nominal short rate is σ′Rσ. The second term is expected inﬂation risk, which
enters in the same form as in the FRM contract. However, inﬂation risk is oﬀset by the third term
which arises from the positive covariance between expected inﬂation and the nominal short rate
(σxe′
2Rσ). In low inﬂation states the mortgage balance erodes only slowly, but the low nominal
CRRA preferences. In numerical work, presented in Section 4.2, we verify that the same risk-return tradeoﬀ that
the constrained households face also hold for CRRA preferences. A full-ﬂedged equilibrium analysis of the mortgage
market is beyond the scope of the current paper.
8short rates and ARM payments provide a hedge. The appendix shows that the risk in the ARM is
approximately equal to the variability of the real rate. We relabel real rate risk as V y. In summary,
the second empirical prediction of the model is that the ARM share should be decreasing in the
real rate variability and increasing in the expected inﬂation variability.













t > 0, (8)
for some generic period t.
2 Empirical Results
We are interested in explaining time variation in the fraction of all newly-originated mortgages
that is of the adjustable-rate type. The main task to render the theory testable is to measure the
nominal bond risk premium. It is the diﬀerence between the current nominal long interest rate

















We propose three alternative ways to compute expected future short rates: using forecaster data
(Section 2.2), using a VAR model (Section 2.3), and using adaptive expectations (Section 2.4).
Throughout, our benchmark results are for τ = 5 years. We also study results for τ = 10 years.
Combined with the current 5-year (10-year) nominal bond yield, the three alternatives deliver three
time series for the 5-year (10-year) nominal bond risk premium. With these measures of the risk
premium in hand, we turn to a regression of the ARM share, deﬁned in Section 2.1, on the bond
risk premia.
2.1 Data on the ARM Share in the U.S.
Our baseline data series is from the Federal Housing Financing Board. It is based on the Monthly
Interest Rate Survey (MIRS), a survey sent out to mortgage lenders.12 These MIRS data include
only new house purchases (for both newly-constructed homes and existing homes), not reﬁnancings.
12Major lenders are asked to report the terms and conditions on all conventional, single-family, fully-amortizing,
purchase-money loans closed the last ﬁve working days of the month. The data thus excludes FHA-insured and
VA-guaranteed mortgages, reﬁnancing loans, and balloon loans. The data for our last sample month, June 2006, are
based on 21,801 reported loans from 74 lenders, representing savings associations, mortgage companies, commercial
banks, and mutual savings banks. The data are weighted to reﬂect the shares of mortgage lending by lender size
and lender type as reported in the latest release of the Federal Reserve Board’s Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
data.
9Purchase-money loans accounts for approximately 60% of the mortgage ﬂow.13 The sample consists
predominantly of conforming loans, only a very small fraction is jumbo mortgages. The ARM share
for jumbos in the MIRS sample is much higher on average, but has a 70% correlation with the
conforming loans in the sample. While the data do not permit precise statements about the
representativeness of the MIRS sample, its ARM share has a correlation of 94% with the ARM
share in the Inside Mortgage Finance data.14 The monthly data start in 1985.1 and run until
2006.6, and we label this series {ARMt}. There is an alternative source of monthly ARM share
data available from Freddie-Mac, based on the Primary Mortgage Market Survey.15 This series is
available from 1995.1 and has a correlation with our benchmark measure of 90%.
2.2 Forecaster Data
Our forecaster data come from Blue Chip Economic Indicators. Twice per year (March and Oc-
tober), a panel of around 40 forecasters predict the average three-month T-bill rate for the next
calendar year, and each of the following four calendar years. They also forecast the average T-bill
rate over the ensuing ﬁve years. We average the consensus forecast data over the ﬁrst ﬁve, or all
ten, years to construct the expected future nominal short rate in (9). This delivers a semi-annual
time-series from 1985 until 2006 for τ = 5 and one for τ = 10. We use linear interpolation of the
forecasts to construct monthly series (1985.1-2006.6).16
Monthly nominal yield data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.17 Com-
bining the 5-year (10-year) T-bond yield with the 5-year (10-year) expected future short rate from
Blue Chip delivers the 5-year (10-year) nominal bond risk premium. Panel A of Figure 4 shows
the 5-year (solid line) and 10-year time-series (dashed line); they have a correlation of 94%.
[Figure 4 about here.]
We then regress the ARM share on the nominal bond risk premium. We lag the predictor
variable for one month in order to study what changes in this month’s risk premium imply for next
month’s mortgage choice. In addition, the use of lagged regressors mitigates potential endogeneity
13Freddie Mac publishes a monthly index of the share of reﬁnancings in mortgage originations. The average reﬁ
share over the 1987.1-2007.1 period is 39.3%.
14We thank Nancy Wallace for making these data available to us. This comparison is for annual data between
1990 and 2006, the longest available sample.
15This survey goes out to 125 lenders. The share is constructed based on the dollar volume of conventional
mortgage originations within the 1-unit Freddie Mac loan limit as reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA) for 2004. Given that Freddie Mac also publishes the aforementioned reﬁnancing share of originations
based on the same Primary Mortgage Market Survey, it appears that this series includes not only purchase mortgages
but also reﬁnancings.
16The correlations with the ARM share are similar if we use either semi-annual or monthly data.
17The nominal yield data are available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006.
10problems that would arise if mortgage choice aﬀected the term structure of interest rates.18 The
ﬁrst two rows of Table 1 shows the slope coeﬃcient, its Newey-West t-statistic using 12 lags, and
the regression R2 for these regressions. Throughout the paper, all regressors are normalized by
their standard deviation for ease of interpretation. The 5-year bond risk premium is a highly
signiﬁcant predictor of the ARM share. It has a t-statistic of 3.9, and explains 40% of the variation
in the ARM share. A one-standard deviation, or one percentage point, increase in the nominal
bond risk premium increases the ARM share by 8.6 percentage points. This is a large eﬀect since
the average ARM share is 28.7%. Intuitively, an FRM holder pays the bond risk premium. An
increase in the risk premium increases the expected payments on the FRM relative to the ARM,
and makes the ARM more attractive. The results with the 10-year risk premium (Row 2) are
comparable. The coeﬃcient has the same magnitude, a t-statistic of 4.2, and an R2 of 43%.
[Table 1 about here.]
2.3 VAR Model
The second way to implement equation (9) is to use a vector auto-regressive (VAR) term structure
model, as in Ang and Piazzesi (2003). The state vector Y contains the 1-year (y$
t(1)), the 5-
year (y$
t(5)), and the 10-year nominal yields (y$
t(10)), as well as realized 1-year log inﬂation (πt =
logΠt−logΠt−1).19 We start the model in 1985, near the end of the Volcker period. Our stationary,
one-regime model would be unﬁt to estimate the entire post-war history (see Ang, Bekaert, and
Wei (2007) and Fama (2006)). Estimating the model at monthly frequency gives us a suﬃciently
many observations (1985.1-2006.6 or 258 months). The VAR(1) structure with the 12-month lag
on the right-hand side is parsimonious and delivers plausible long-term expectations.20 We use the
letter u to denote time in months, while t continues to denote time in years. The law of motion
for the state is
Yu+12 = µ + ΓYu + ηu+12, with ηu+12 | Iu ∼ D(0,Σt), (10)
with Iu representing the information at time u. Appendix B discusses our model for the conditional
covariance matrix Σt.
18As a robustness check, we have tested for Granger causality. First, we regress the ARM share on its own lag
and the lagged bond risk premium; the lagged bond risk premium is statistically signiﬁcant. Second, we regress
the bond risk premium on its lag and the lagged ARM share; the lagged ARM share is statistically insigniﬁcant.
Therefore, the bond risk premium Granges causes the ARM share, but the reverse is not true.
19The inﬂation rate is based on the monthly Consumer Price Index for for all urban consumers from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. The inﬂation data are available at http://www.bls.gov.
20As a robustness check, we considered a VAR(2) model and estimated the model on the basis of quarterly instead
of monthly data. The results become even somewhat stronger for a second-order VAR model and we found similar
results for quarterly data as for monthly data.



























Together with the nominal long yield, this delivers our second measure of the nominal bond risk
premium in (9). Panel B of Figure 4 shows the 5-year and 10-year time series; they have a
correlation of 96%.
Rows 3 and 4 of Table 1 show the ARM regression results using the VAR-based 5-year and
10-year bond risk premium. Again, both bond risk premia are highly signiﬁcant predictors of
the ARM share. The t-statistics are 4.2 and 3.9. They explain 32% and 35% of the variation
in the ARM share, respectively. Interestingly, the economic magnitude of the coeﬃcients is very
close to the one obtained from forecasters: A one-standard deviation increase in the risk premium
increases the ARM share by about 8 percentage points. The next step is to include the 1-year
ahead conditional variances of the real rate (V
y
t ) and inﬂation (V x
t ) in the ARM share regression.
Rows 5 and 6 show that both enter with the predicted sign. That is, the ARM share increases in
periods of high inﬂation uncertainty, and decreases when the real rate volatility is high. However,
they are not signiﬁcant and add relatively little value beyond the nominal bond risk premium.
2.4 Rule-of-Thumb
Section 1 developed a model of rational mortgage choice where time variation in mortgage choice
was driven by time variation in bond risk premia. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 then used two diﬀerent ways
of computing forward-looking expectations of future nominal short rates that entered the nominal
bond risk premium. The empirical evidence supported the claim that these bond risk premia are
related to the ARM share variation. One potential concern with this explanation for mortgage
choice is that it requires substantial “ﬁnancial sophistication” on the part of the households to
choose the “right mortgage at the right time”. Campbell (2006) expresses scepticism about such
sophistication, and presents examples of investment mistakes. Even though mortgage choice is one
of the most important ﬁnancial decisions, and even though households may obtain advice from
ﬁnancial professionals or mortgage lenders, we take such scepticism seriously. After all, estimating
a VAR model to form conditional expectations may be beyond reach for the average household. In
this section, we address this concern and show that a simple rule-of-thumb captures most of the
variation in mortgage choice. The rule-of-thumb is strongly related to our measures of bond risk
premia. It also nests two previously-proposed predictors of mortgage choice: the yield spread and
the long-term interest rate.
In particular, we assume that households approximate conditional expectations of future short




























t−u(12) ≡ κt(ρ;τ). (12)
Equation (12) is a model of adaptive expectations that only requires knowledge of the current long
bond rate, a history of recent short rates, and the ability to calculate a simple average. Our third
measure for bond risk premia is the rule-of-thumb κt(ρ;τ), computed oﬀ Treasury interest rates.
Panel C of Figure 4 shows the τ = 5- and τ = 10-year time-series with a three year look-back
(ρ = 36 months). They have a correlation of 92%. Since we consider look-back periods up to 5
years, we loose the ﬁrst 5 years of observations, and the series start in 1989.12.21
Rows 7 and 8 of Table 1 show the ARM regression results using κt(36;5) and κt(36;10). The
rule-of-thumb gives the strongest results among the three measures of the bond risk premium. The
5-year (10-year) bond risk premium has a t-statistics of 7.1 (7.5) and explains 71% (68%) of the
variation in the ARM share! The economic magnitude of the coeﬃcients is very close to the one
from the previous two measures: A one-standard deviation increase in the risk premium increases
the ARM share by about 8 percentage points. Figure 3 in the introduction illustrates the striking
co-movement between the ARM share and the rule-of-thumb for ρ = 36 months.
The left panel of Figure 5 shows the correlation of κt(ρ,5) with the ARM share for diﬀerent
values of ρ (blue bars). The bars correspond to ρ = 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 months look-back.
The results are shown for the period 1989.12-2006.6, the longest sample for which all measures are
available. The rule-of-thumb measure of bond risk premia has the strongest association with the
ARM share for intermediate values of the horizon over which average short rates are computed. The
correlation is hump-shaped in ρ in both panels. The highest correlation with observed mortgage
choice is obtained when households use 3 years of short rate data in their computation. The
correlation peaks around 80%.
It should perhaps not come as a surprise that κt(ρ;τ) explains the variation in the ARM share
better for the optimal value of ρ than using the bond risk premium measure that we derived from
the forecaster data or from the VAR model. After all, we now use a simpler model of expectations
that can easily be implemented by households. If this model accurately describes households’
21We do not extend the sample before 1985.1 for two reasons. First, the interest rates in the early 1980s were
dramatically diﬀerent from those in the period we analyze. As such, we do not consider it to be plausible that
households use adaptive expectations and data from the “Volcker regime” to form κ in the ﬁrst years of our sample.
A second and related reason is that Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2006) argue that there is a structural break in
bond risk premia in the early 1980s. To avoid any spurious results due to structural breaks, we restrict attention
to the period 1985.1-2006.6.
13behavior, we expect it to explain more of the variation in households’ mortgage choice. In sum,
this simple way of computing bond risk premia explains most of the variation in the ARM share.
Section 3 is devoted to understanding the diﬀerence between the three risk premium measures in
more depth.
[Figure 5 about here.]
2.5 Alternative Interest Rate Measures
The rule-of-thumb has the appealing feature that it nests two commonly-used predictors of mort-
gage choice as special cases (Campbell and Cocco (2003), Campbell (2006), and Vickery (2006)).






The yield spread is the optimal predictor of mortgage choice in our model only if the conditional
expectation of future short rates equals the current short rate. This is the case only when short
rates follow a random walk. Second, when ρ → ∞, then κt(ρ;T) converges to the long-term yield












by the law of large numbers.22 Because the second term is constant, all variation in ﬁnancial
incentives to choose a particular mortgage originates from variation in the long-term yield. This
rule is optimal when short rates are constant. For all cases in between the two extremes, the simple
model of adaptive expectations puts some positive and ﬁnite weight on average recent short-term
yields to form conditional expectations.
Yield Spread The solid line in left panel of Figure 5 depicts the correlation between the yield
spread and the ARM share (ρ = 1). It shows that the yield spread has a weak contemporaneous
correlation with the ARM share (1989.12-2006.6). Rows 9 and 10 of Table 1 conﬁrm that the lagged
yield spread explains very little of the variation in the ARM share in the full sample (1985.1-2006.6);
the R2 is less than 1 percent.
Equation (9) allows us to decompose the nominal yield spread into the nominal bond risk
premium and the deviations of average expected future short rates and the current nominal short

























This condition is useful in understanding the diﬀerence between the slope of the yield curve and
the long-term bond risk premium. In a homoscedastic world with zero risk premia (φ$
t(τ) = 0),
the yield spread equals the diﬀerence between the average expected future short rates and the
current short rate. Since long-term bond rates are the average of current and expected future
short rates, both the FRM and the ARM investor will face the same expected payment stream in
this world. The yield spread is completely uninformative about mortgage choice. Likewise, in a
world with constant risk premia, variations in the yield spread capture variations in deviations
between expected future short rates and the current short rate. But again, these variations are
priced into both the ARM and the FRM contract. It is only the bond risk premium which aﬀects the
mortgage choice for a risk-averse investor. In our model with time-varying risk premia, estimated
above, it turns out that the two terms on the right-hand side of (14) are negatively correlated.
This makes the yield spread a noisy proxy for the nominal bond risk premium, and is responsible
for the low R2 in the regression of the ARM share on the yield spread.
Long Yields The dashed line in the left panel of Figure 5 shows that the correlation between the
ARM share and the long rate is much higher than the correlation with the slope of the yield curve,
but it is dominated by the rule-of-thumb. Rows 11 and 12 of Table 1 show that one standard
deviation increase in the 10-year yield increases the ARM share by 8.5% in the full sample, a
similar magnitude as for the risk premium. As we show in Section 3, the long yield performs much
worse in recent times.
Mortgage Rates An alternative source of interest rate data comes from the mortgage market.
We use the 1-year ARM rate as our measure of the short rate and the 30-year FRM rate as our
measure of the long rate.23 The right panel of Figure 5 shows the correlation of κt(ρ,5) with the
ARM share for diﬀerent values of ρ (blue bars), computed using mortgage rates. The rule-of-thumb
achieves its highest correlation of for an intermediate horizon of two years, comparable to what we
ﬁnd for Treasury yields.
As we did for Treasury yields, we regress the ARM share on the slope of the yield curve (30-year
FRM rate minus 1-year ARM rate) and the long yield (30-year FRM rate). Row 13 of Table 1
shows that the FRM-ARM spread has much higher explanatory power than the Treasury yield
spread. However, the improvement occurs only because it contains additional information that is
23We use the eﬀective rate data from the Federal Housing Financing Board, Table 23. The eﬀective rate adjusts
the contractual rate for the discounted value of initial fees and charges. The FRM-ARM spreads with and without
fees have a correlation of .998.
15not in the Treasury yield spread.24 The explanatory power of the FRM rate is similar to that of
the long Treasury yield (Row 15 and right panel of Figure 5).
Other Rules-of-Thumb The rule-of-thumb that we introduce in Section 2.4 is motivated by the
theoretical model in Section 1 and provides a way to compute the expectations of future short rates
in (9). We now study two additional interest rate-based variables which implement alternative,
more ad-hoc, rules-of-thumb. The ﬁrst rule takes the current FRM rate minus the three-year
moving average of FRM rate (row 16 of Table 1). The second rule does the same, but for the ARM
rate (row 17). The ﬁrst rule captures the idea behind the popular investment advice of “locking in
a low long-term rate while you can”. The slope coeﬃcients in the FRM and ARM rule are smaller
than what we ﬁnd for the bond risk premium (6.0 and 3.1) and less precisely measured (t-stats of
3.7 and 2.4). The R2 in the two regressions are 22% and 6%, respectively. Both alternative rules
perform worse than the rule-of-thumb of Section 2.4, which is guided by the theory.
3 The Recent Episode and the Inﬂation Risk Premium
The previous sections show that various measures of the bond risk premium are positively and
signiﬁcantly related to the choice between an ARM and FRM mortgage. In this section, we inves-
tigate the diﬀerence between the rule-of-thumb measure, which shows the strongest relationship
and is based on adaptive expectations, and the forecasters- and VAR-based measures, which show
a somewhat weaker relationship and are based on forward-looking expectations.
Figure 6 shows that this diﬀerence in performance is especially pronounced after 2004. The
ﬁgure displays the 10-year rolling-window correlation for each of the three measures with the
ARM share. While the rule-of-thumb measure has a stable correlation across sub-samples, the
performance of the forecasters-based measure as well as the VAR-based measure drop oﬀ steeply
in 2004 and beyond.
[Figure 6 about here.]
The reason for this failure is that the ARM share increased substantially between June 2003
and December 2004 with no commensurate increase in the Blue Chip or VAR risk premia measures.
24The correlation between the FRM-ARM spread and the 10-1-year government bond yield spread is only 32%.
This spread also captures the value of the prepayment option, as well as the lenders’ proﬁt margin diﬀerential on
the FRM and ARM contracts. To get at this additional information, we orthogonalize the FRM-ARM spread to
the 10-1 yield spread, and regress the ARM share on the orthogonal component (Row 14). For the full sample, we
ﬁnd a strongly signiﬁcant eﬀect on the ARM share. Partially this is due to the fact that this orthogonal spread
component has a correlation of 60% with the fee diﬀerential between an FRM and an ARM contract. It only has a
correlation of 16% with the rule-of-thumb risk premium.
16Figure 2 illustrates this breakdown in comovement for the Blue Chip data. A similarly steep drop-
oﬀ in correlation occurs for the long yield and for the FRM-ARM rate diﬀerential, both of which
also performed well in the full sample. We explore two possible explanations for why the ARM
share was high in 2004 when the forward-looking bond risk premia were low.
3.1 Product Innovation in the ARM Segment
A ﬁrst potential explanation for the increase in the ARM share between June 2003 and December
2004 is product innovation in the ARM segment of the mortgage markets. An important develop-
ment was the increased popularity of hybrid mortgages: adjustable-rate mortgages with an initial
ﬁxed-rate period.25 Figure 7 shows our benchmark measure of the ARM share (solid line) along-
side a measure of the ARM share that excludes all hybrid contracts with initial ﬁxed-rate period
longer than three years. We label this measure   ARM. A substantial fraction of the increase in
the ARM share in 2003-05 was due to the rise of hybrids. Under this hypothesis the ARM share
went up despite the low bond risk premium because new types of ARM mortgage contracts became
available that unlocked the dream of home ownership.26
[Figure 7 about here.]
To test this hypothesis, we recompute the rolling correlations for   ARM, which excludes the
hybrids. The correlation with the forecasters-based measure over the last 10-year window improves
from 23% to 48%. The correlation over the longest available sample (since 1992) improves from
44% to 67%. In sum, the recently increased prevalence of the hybrids is part of the explanation.
However, it cannot account for the entire story.
3.2 Forecast Errors
A second potential explanation is that the forecasters made substantial errors in their predictions
of future short rates in recent times. We recall that nominal short rates came down substantially
from 6% in 2000 to 1% in June 2003. Our Blue Chip data show that forecasters expected short
rates to increase substantially from their 1% level in June 2003. Instead, nominal short rates
increased only moderately to 2.2% by December 2004. Forecasters substantially over-estimated
future short rates starting in the 2003.6-2004.12 period. As a result, the Blue Chip measure of
bond risk premia is too low in that episode, and underestimates the desirability of ARMs.
25Starting in 1992, we know the decomposition of the ARM by initial ﬁxed-rate period. We are grateful to James
Vickery for making these detailed data available to us.
26In addition to the hybrid segment, the sub-prime market segment, which predominantly oﬀers ARM contracts,
also grew strongly over that period. However, our ARM sample does not contain this market segment.
17Forecast errors in nominal rates translate in forecast errors for real rates. This is in particular
the case when inﬂation is relatively stable and therefore easier to forecast. Figure 8 shows that the
Blue Chip consensus forecast for the average real short rate over the next two years shows large
disparities with its realized counterpart. We calculate the average expected future real short rate
as the diﬀerence between the Blue Chip consensus average expected future nominal short rate and
the Blue Chip consensus average expected future inﬂation rate. We calculate the realized real rate
as the diﬀerence between the realized nominal rate and expected inﬂation, which we measure as
the one-quarter ahead inﬂation forecast. The realized average future real short rates are calculated
from the realized real rates. Finally, the forecast errors are scaled by the nominal short rate to
obtain relative forecasting errors. The ﬁgure shows huge forecast errors in the 2000-2003 period,
relative to the earlier period. The forecast errors are on the order of 1.25 percentage point per
year, about 50-75% of the value of the nominal short rate. These large forecast errors motivate
the use of the inﬂation risk premium, as explained below.
[Figure 8 about here.]
A similar problem arises with the VAR-based bond risk premium. The VAR system also fails
to pick up the declining short rates in the 2000-2004 period. It therefore also over-predicts the
short rate and underestimates the desirability of ARM contracts.
Filtering Out Forecast Errors Forecast errors in the real rate not only help us identify the
problem, they also oﬀer the key to the solution. The nominal bond risk premium in the model of








Similar to the nominal risk premium in (9), the real rate risk premium, φ
y
t, is the diﬀerence between
the observed real long rate and the average expected future real short rate:
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where yt(τ) is the real yield of a τ-month real bond at time t. Following Ang, Bekaert, and Wei
(2007), we deﬁne the inﬂation premium at time t, φx
t, as the diﬀerence between long-term nominal





t(τ) − yt(τ) − xt(τ). (17)




Et [logΠt+τ − logΠt].
A key insight is that both the nominal long yield y$
t(τ) and the real long yield yt(τ) contain
expected future real short rates. Thus, their diﬀerence does not. Therefore, their diﬀerence zeroes
out any forecast errors in expected future real short rates. Equation (17) shows that the inﬂation-
risk premium, φx
t(τ), contains the diﬀerence between y$
t(τ) − yt(τ), and therefore does not suﬀer
from the forecast error problem.27 In short, one way to correct the nominal bond risk premium for
the forecast error is to only use the inﬂation risk premium component.
Measuring the Inﬂation Risk Premium To implement equation (17), we need a measure of
long real yields and a measure of expected future inﬂation rates. Real yield data are available as of
January 1997 when the US Treasury introduced Treasury Inﬂation-Protected Securities (TIPS).28
We omit the ﬁrst six months when liquidity was low, and only a 5-year bond was trading. In what
follows, we consider two empirical measures for expected inﬂation.
Our ﬁrst measure for expected inﬂation is computed from the same semi-annual Blue Chip
long-range consensus forecast data we used for the nominal short rate, using the same method,
but using the series for the CPI forecast instead of the nominal short rate.29 The inﬂation-risk
premium is then obtained by subtracting the real long yield and long-term expected inﬂation from
the nominal long yield, as in (17).
Alternatively, we can use the VAR to form expected future inﬂation rates and thereby the
inﬂation risk premium. We start by constructing the 1-year expected inﬂation series as a function
of the state vector





where e4 denotes the fourth unit vector. Next, we use the VAR structure to determine the τ-year
27The same Blue Chip forecast data, as well as data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, indeed show
that inﬂation forecasts do not suﬀer from the same problem as nominal interest rate forecasts. This is consistent
with Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007), who argue that inﬂation forecasts provide the best predictors of future inﬂation
among a wide set of alternatives.
28The real yield data are available from McCulloch at http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/jhm/ts/ts.html.
29We have compared the inﬂation forecasts from Blue Chip with those from the Survey of Professional Forecasters,
the Livingston Survey, and the Michigan Survey, and found them to be very close. Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2006)
argue that such survey data provides the best inﬂation forecasts among a wide array of methods.





























With the long-term expected inﬂation from (19) in hand, we form the inﬂation risk premium as
the diﬀerence between the observed nominal yield, the observed real yield, and expected inﬂation.
Results Figure 9 shows the inﬂation risk premium (dashed line) alongside the ARM share (solid
line). The inﬂation risk premium is based on Blue Chip forecast data. Between March 2003 and
March 2005 (closest survey dates), the inﬂation risk premium increased by 1.2 percentage points,
or two standard deviations. The nominal bond risk premium, in contrast, only increased only by
one standard deviation.
[Figure 9 about here.]
Over the period 1997.7-2006.6, the raw correlation between the ARM share and the 5-year
(10-year) inﬂation risk premium is 84% (82%) for the Blue Chip measure and 80% (78%) for the
VAR measure. Finally, we regress the ARM share on the 5-year and 10-year inﬂation risk premium
for the period 1997.7-2006.6. For the Blue Chip measure, we ﬁnd a point estimate of 6.95 (6.97) for
the 5-year (10-year) inﬂation risk premium. The economic eﬀect is therefore comparable to what
we ﬁnd for the nominal bond risk premium (Section 2.2). The coeﬃcient is measured precisely;
the t-statistic is 8.0 (7.9). The 5-year (10-year) inﬂation-risk premium alone explains 66% of the
variation (67%) in the ARM share. Likewise, for the VAR-based measure, we ﬁnd a point estimate
of 6.80 (6.40) for the 5-year (10-year) inﬂation risk premium. The coeﬃcient is measured precisely;
the t-statistic equals 8.5 (6.8). The inﬂation risk premium alone explains 64% of the variation
(56%) in the ARM share. We conclude that the inﬂation risk premium has been a very strong
determinant of the ARM share in the last ten years.
In conclusion, in 2003 and 2004, the forward-looking expectations measures of the bond risk
premium suﬀered from large diﬀerences between realized average short rates, and what forecasters
or a VAR predicted for these same average short rates. The adaptive expectations scheme of the
rule-of-thumb did not suﬀer from the same problem. This explains why it performed much better
in predicting the ARM share in the last part of the sample. The inﬂation risk premium component
of the bond risk premium successfully purges that forecast error from the forward-looking bond risk
premium measures. We showed that it is a strong predictor of the ARM share in the 1997.7-2006.6
sample.
204 Robustness
In this section we discuss several alternative model assumptions, variable deﬁnitions, and a new
loan-level data set. We ﬁnd that our main ﬁnding is robust to these alternative speciﬁcations; the
bond risk premium remains an important determinant of mortgage choice.
4.1 Prepayment Option
Sofar we have ignored one other potentially important determinant of mortgage choice: the pre-
payment option. In the US, an FRM contract typically has an embedded option which allows the
mortgage borrower to pay oﬀ the loan at will. We show how the presence of the prepayment option
aﬀects mortgage choice within the utility framework of Section 1.
FRM Rate With Prepayment A household prefers to prepay at time 1 if the utility derived
from the ARM contract exceeds that of the FRM contract. Prepayment entails no costs, but this
assumption is easy to relax in our framework. It then immediately follows from comparing the






where the superscript P in qFRMP
0 indicates the FRM contract with prepayment. The FRM rate
with prepayment satisﬁes the following zero-proﬁt condition. It stipulates that the present value
























































where the last term represents the value of the embedded prepayment option held by the household.

































where Φ( ) is the cumulative standard normal distribution, and the expressions for d1 and d2 are
provided in Appendix C. The second step is an application of the Black and Scholes (1973) formula






European call options on a two-period bond with expiration date




1 ), and with an exercise price of
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0 (2)B (1 − Φ(d1)).
The mortgage balance equals the sum of (i) the (discounted) payments at time t = 1, a certain
interest payment and a principal payment with risk-adjusted probability Φ(d2), and (ii) the (dis-
counted) payments at time t = 2, when both interest and principal payments are received with
risk-adjusted probability 1 − Φ(d1). The no-arbitrage rate qFRMP
0 on an FRM with prepayment




1 − (1 − Φ(d1))P $
0 (2) − Φ(d2)P $
0 (1)
P $
0 (1) + (1 − Φ(d1))P $
0 (2)
,
which cannot be solved for analytically as qFRMP
0 appears in d1 and d2 on the right-hand side. For
Φ(d1) = Φ(d2) = 1, prepayment is certain, and we retrieve the expression for the year-one ARM
rate, qARM
0 . For Φ(d1) = Φ(d2) = 0, prepayment occurs with zero probability, and we obtain the
expression for the FRM without prepayment, qFRM
0 .
This framework clariﬁes the relationship between time-varying bond risk premia and the price
of the prepayment option. The bond risk premium goes up when the price of interest rate risk goes
down. But a decrease in the price of risk also makes prepayment less likely under the risk-neutral
distribution. Therefore, the price of the prepayment option is decreasing in the bond risk premium.
Reduced Sensitivity A ﬁxed-rate mortgage without prepayment option is a coupon-bearing
nominal bond, issued by the borrower and held by the lender.30 An FRM with prepayment option
resembles a callable bond: the borrower has the right to prepay the outstanding mortgage debt at
any point in time. The price sensitivity of a callable bond to interest rate shocks diﬀers from that
of a regular bond. This is illustrated in Figure 10. We use the bond pricing setup of Section 1.2
and set µy = µx = 2%, ρy = ρx = 0.5, ρxy = 0, σy = σx = 2%, and λ0 = [−0.4,−0.4]
′. These values
imply a two-period nominal bond risk premium of φ$
0 (2) = 0.78%. We vary the short rate at time
zero, y$
0 (1) = y0 (1) + x0, assuming y0(1) = x0. The callable bond can be called at time one with
exercise price of 0.96 (per dollar face value). The non-callable bond price is decreasing and convex
in the nominal interest rate. The callable bond price is also decreasing in the nominal interest rate,
but, the relationship becomes concave when the call option is in the money (“negative convexity”).
This means that the callable bond has positive, but diminished exposure to nominal interest-rate
risk.
30This analogy is exact for an interest-only mortgage. When the mortgage balance is paid oﬀ during the con-
tractual period (amortizing), the loan can be thought of as a portfolio of bonds with maturities equal to the dates
on which the down-payments occur. Acharya and Carpenter (2002) discuss the valuation of callable, defaultable
bonds.
22[Figure 10 about here.]
Utility Implications of the Prepayment Option Next, we study how the prepayment option
aﬀects the relationship between the bond risk premium and the ARM-FRM utility diﬀerential. We
use the same term-structure variables as in Figure 10, but vary the market prices of risk λ0. We
maintain the assumption of equal prices of inﬂation risk and real interest rate risk, and ﬁx the
initial real interest and inﬂation rate at their unconditional means, i.e. y0 (1) = µy and x0 = µx.
We assume the investor has a mortgage balance and house size normalized to 1, constant real
labor income of 0.41, and a risk aversion coeﬃcient γ = 10. Figure 11 plots the diﬀerence between
the lifetime utility from the ARM contract and the lifetime utility from the FRM contract. The
solid line depicts the case without prepayment option; the dashed line plots the utility diﬀerence
when the FRM has the prepayment option. No approximations are used for this exercise. The
utility diﬀerence is increasing in the bond risk premium, both with and without prepayment option.
However, the sensitivity of the utility diﬀerence to changes in the bond risk premium is somewhat
reduced in presence of a prepayment option. This is consistent with the fact that a callable bond
has diminished interest rate exposure and therefore contains a lower bond risk premium than a
non-callable bond. This shows that our main result, a positive relationship between the utility
diﬀerence of an ARM and an FRM contract and the nominal bond risk premium, goes through.
[Figure 11 about here.]
4.2 Impatience and Moving
To investigate the role of the subjective discount factor and the moving rate, we solve a multi-
period extension of the model in Section 1. In contrast to the household’s preferences in (1), we
use a time-separable CRRA utility function over real consumption with subjective discount factor
β. We allow for an exogenous moving probability. Section 2.5 showed that the yield spread did
not display a strong co-movement with the ARM share. We argued that it not only captures the
bond risk premium, but also deviations of expected future short rates from current short rates.
However, when a household is perfectly impatient and only cares about consumption in the current
period (β = 0), only the current period’s diﬀerential between the long-term and the short-term
interest rate matters. The same is true if a household plans to move in the current year.31 The
model features 360-month mortgage contracts, and the term structure dynamics are taken from
Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2007). As was the case in the data, the correlation between the yield
31Mobility in and of itself is an unlikely candidate to explain variation in the ARM share. Current Population
Survey data for 1948-2004 from the US Census show that the average annual (monthly) moving rate is 18.1%
(1.27%), and the out-of-county moving rate is 6.2% (1.16%). Moreover, these moving rates show no systematic
variation over time.
23spread and the bond risk premium is low in the model (-7%). Figure 12 plots the R2 of regressing
the model’s certainty-equivalent consumption diﬀerential between the ARM and FRM contracts
on the model’s bond risk premium (solid line) or on the model’s yield spread (dashed line). Each
point corresponds to a diﬀerent value of the (annual) subjective time discount factor β, between
0.5 and 1. For low values of the subjective discount factor (β < .70), the slope of the yield curve
has a stronger relationship to the relative desirability of the ARM. However, for higher values of
β (e.g., conventional values such as β = .95), only the bond risk premium matters. We have also
experimented with an upward sloping labor income proﬁle, as in Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout
(2005), and found a similar cut-oﬀ rule. Finally, a similar result hold for mobility rates: below 10%
per month, the risk premium is the more important predictor. For empirically relevant moving
rates below 2%, the risk premium is the only relevant predictor.
[Figure 12 about here.]
Finally, we have investigated the extent to which the yield spread aﬀects mortgage choice in
the data, over and above the risk premium. In a multiple regression of the ARM share on the
risk premium and the yield spread, the latter was typically not signiﬁcant. Its sign ﬂips across
speciﬁcations, its t-statistic is low, and it does not contribute to the R2 of the regression, beyond
the eﬀect of the risk premium.
4.3 Financial Constraints
One alternative hypothesis is that there is a group of ﬁnancially-constrained households which
postpones the purchase of a house until the ARM rate is suﬃciently low to qualify for a mortgage
loan. Under this alternative hypothesis, the time-series variation in the dollar volume of ARMs
would drive the variation in the ARM share. Figure 13 plots the dollar volume of ARM and FRM
mortgage originations for the entire U.S. market, scaled by the overall size of the mortgage market.
The data are compiled by OFHEO. It shows that there are large year-on-year ﬂuctuations in both
the ARM and the FRM market segment. This dispels the hypothesis that the variation in the
ARM share over the last 20 years is driven by ﬂuctuations in participation in the ARM segment.
[Figure 13 about here.]
Loan-level Data Individual-level loan data provide a more direct vehicle to investigate the
importance of ﬁnancial constraints. We explore a new data set which contains information on
911,000 loans from a large mortgage trustee for mortgage-backed security special purpose vehicles.32
32It contains data from many of the largest mortgage lenders (Aames Capital, Bank of America, Citi Mortgage,
Countrywide, Indymac, Option One, Ownit, Wells Fargo, Washington Mutual). We use information on the loan
24While the sample spans 1994-2007, 95% of mortgage contracts are originated between 2000 and
2005, a period for which we have argued mortgage choice is more diﬃcult to explain. Nevertheless,
it would be reassuring to ﬁnd that the same variable that explains the aggregate time series of
mortgage choice also explains mortgage choice in the cross-section. Furthermore, we can investigate
the extent to which variables that capture credit constraints, such as the loan’s balance, FICO
score, and loan-to-value ratio, aﬀect mortgage choice. Finally, the data allow us to investigate the
regional dimension of mortgage choice.
Table 2 reports loan-level results of probit regressions of an ARM dummy. All right-hand
side variables have been scaled by their standard deviation. We report the coeﬃcient estimate, a
robust t-statistic, and the faction of loans that is correctly classiﬁed by the probit model.33 We
keep the 654,368 loans for which we have all variables of interest available. The ﬁrst row shows that
the rule-of-thumb bond risk premium is a strong predictor of loan-level mortgage choice. It has
the right sign, a t-statistic of 253, and it -alone- classiﬁes 69.4% of loans correctly. Its coeﬃcient
indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the bond risk premium increases the probability
of an ARM choice from 39% to 56%, an increase of more than one-third. Row 2 shows the probit
results without bond risk premium, but with three prominent indicators of ﬁnancial constraints,
loan balance, FICO, and LTV, and with four regional dummies for the biggest mortgage markets
(California, Florida, New York, and Texas). A lower balance, lower FICO scores, and especially
higher LTV ratio increase the probability of the ARM. However, the (scaled) coeﬃcients on the loan
characteristics are smaller than the bond risk premium coeﬃcient, suggesting a smaller economic
eﬀect. Furthermore, the three ﬁnancial constraint variables classify only 59% of loans correctly;
adding four state dummies increases correct classiﬁcations to 61.7%. Relative to row 1, adding the
same three characteristics and four regional dummies to the bond risk premium does not increase
the probability of classiﬁed loans (Row 3). The number of classiﬁed loans is 68.8%, no bigger of
what is explained by the bond risk premium alone.34 Moreover, the bond risk premium remains
the largest and by far the most signiﬁcant regressor. Its marginal eﬀect on the probability of
choosing an ARM is unaﬀected. The fourth row adds the 5-year bond yield to the set of regressors.
The eﬀect of the bond risk premium increases and is estimated more precisely. The long yield is
signiﬁcant, but comes in with the wrong sign (the same happens if the only regressor is the long
yield). The ﬁfth row adds the yield spread, the diﬀerence between the 5-year and the 1-year bond
yields. It enters with the correct sign and is highly signiﬁcant. However, it further strengthens the
type, the loan origination year and month, the balance, the loan-to-value ratio, the FICO score, and the contract
rate at origination. We also have geographic information on the region of origination. We merge these data with
our bond risk premium and interest rate variables, with matching based on month of origination. We thank Nancy
Wallace for graciously making these data available to us.
33By pure chance, one would classify 50% of the contracts correctly.
34Note that the maximum likelihood estimation does not maximize correct classiﬁcations, so that adding regressors
does not necessarily increase correct classiﬁcations.
25eﬀect of the risk premium. The coeﬃcient is 50% higher than in the third row, and the t-statistic
is 308 compared to 253. Correct loan classiﬁcations increase slightly to 70.9%. It does not seem
to be the case that the eﬀect of the yield spread solely captures binding borrowing constraints.
Adding the yield spread to the bond risk premium as an explanatory variable has a much stronger
eﬀect than adding the ﬁnancial constraint variables plus regional dummies.
We conclude that, ﬁrst, the bond risk premium is a powerful predictor of mortgage choice in
these loan-level data. Second, while measures of ﬁnancial constraints certainly enter signiﬁcantly
in these regressions, both their economic and statistical eﬀect on mortgage choice is smaller.35
[Table 2 about here.]
Regional Variation There is substantial cross-state variation in mortgage choice in the US. In
2006, the ARM share was above 40% in California, but less than 10% in Connecticut. The loan-
level data set is large enough to investigate the relationship between the ARM share on the bond
risk premium state by state. We ﬁnd strong positive co-movement for all states. Interestingly, the
size of the probit coeﬃcient and its t-statistic are rather similar across states. This suggests that
the cross-state variation in ARM share is a level-eﬀect, which does not interfere with our model of
time variation in the ARM share.
4.4 Persistence of Regressor
In contrast to the bond risk premium, most term structure variables do not explain much of the
variation in the ARM share (Table 1). This is especially true in the last ten years of our sample,
when the inﬂation risk premium has strong explanatory power (Section 3), but the real yield or
the FRM-ARM rate diﬀerential do not. This suggests that our results for the risk premium are
not simply an artifact of regressing a persistent regressand on a persistent regressor, because many
of the other term structure variables are at least as persistent.36 To further investigate this issue,
we conduct a block-bootstrap exercise, drawing 10,000 times with replacement 12-month blocks
of innovations from an augmented VAR. The latter consists of the four equations of the VAR of
Section 2.3, and is augmented with an equation for the ARM share. The ARM share equation
is allowed to depend on the four lagged VAR elements, as well as on its own lag. The lagged
ARM share itself does not aﬀect the VAR elements. The bootstrap estimate recovers the point
estimate (no bias), and it leads to a conﬁdence interval that is narrower (6.40) than the Newey-
West conﬁdence interval we use in the main text (8.24), but wider than an OLS conﬁdence interval
(3.73). We conclude that the Newey-West standard errors we report are conservative.
35We also investigated the eﬀect of the aggregate loan-to-value ratio, aggregate house price-income, and house
price-rent ratios on the ARM share, but found no relationship.
36The ARM share itself is not that persistent. Its annual autocorrelation is 30%, compared to 76% for the one-year
nominal interest rate. An AR(1) at an annual frequency only explains 8.8% of the variation in the ARM share.
26One further robustness check we performed is to regress quarterly changes in the ARM share
(between periods t and t+3) on changes in the term structure variables of the benchmark regression
speciﬁcation (between periods t−1 and t). We continue to ﬁnd a positive and strongly signiﬁcant
eﬀect of the risk premium on the ARM share (t-statistic around 5). The eﬀect of a change in the
bond risk premium is similar to the one estimated from the level regressions: a one percentage point
increase in the bond risk premium leads to a 10 percentage point increase in the ARM share over
the next quarter. The R2 of the regression in changes is obviously lower, but still substantial. For
the 5-year (10-year) risk premium based on the VAR, it is 12% (18%), for the forecaster measure
it is 25% (30%), and for the rule-of-thumb it is 26% (27%).
4.5 Liquidity and the TIPS Market
The results in Section 3, which use the inﬂation risk premium, are based on TIPS data. The
TIPS markets suﬀered from liquidity problems during the ﬁrst years of operation, which may have
introduced a liquidity premium in TIPS yields (see Shen and Corning (2001) and Jarrow and
Yildirim (2003)). A liquidity premium is likely to induce a downward bias in the inﬂation risk
premium. As long as this bias does not systematically covary with the ARM share, it operates as
an innocuous level eﬀect and adds measurement error.
To rule out the possibility that our inﬂation risk premium results are driven by liquidity pre-
mia, we use real yield data backed-out from the term structure model of Ang, Bekaert, and Wei
(2007) instead of the TIPS yields. We treat the real yields as observed, and use them to construct
the inﬂation risk premium.37 Since the Ang-Bekaert-Wei data are quarterly (1985.IV-2004.IV),
we construct the quarterly ARM share as the simple average of the three monthly ARM share
observations in that quarter. We then regress the quarterly ARM share on the one-quarter lagged
inﬂation and real rate risk premium. We ﬁnd that both components of the nominal bond risk pre-
mium, the inﬂation-risk premium, and the real rate risk premium, enter with a positive sign. This
is consistent with the theoretical model developed in Section 1. Both coeﬃcients are statistically
signiﬁcant: The Newey-West t-statistic on the inﬂation risk premium is 3.90 and the t-statistic on
the real rate risk premium is 2.12. The regression R-squared is 53%.
As a ﬁnal robustness check, we repeated our regressions using only TIPS data after 1999.1, after
the initial period of illiquidity. We found very similar results to those based on data starting in
1997.7. This suggests that liquidity problems in TIPS markets may have aﬀected the inﬂation-risk
premium, but this does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect our results. We conclude that our results are robust
to using alternative real yield data.
37We thank Andrew Ang for making these data available to us.
275 Conclusion
We have shown that the time variation in the nominal risk premium on a long-term nominal bond
can explain a large fraction of the variation in the share of newly-originated mortgages that are of
the adjustable-rate type. Thinking of ﬁxed-rate mortgages as a short position in long-term bonds
and adjustable-rate mortgages as rolling over a short position in short-term bonds implies that
ﬁxed-rate mortgage holders are paying a nominal bond risk premium. The higher the bond risk
premium, the more expensive the FRM, and the higher the ARM share. Our results are consistent
across three diﬀerent methods of computing bond risk premia. We used forecasters’ expectations,
a VAR-model, and a simple adaptive expectation scheme, or “rule-of-thumb”. This last measure
explains 70% of the variation in the ARM share. Other, perhaps more straightforward, term
structure variables such as the slope of the yield curve, have much lower explanatory power for the
ARM share.
For all three measures of the bond risk premium, a one standard deviation increase leads to an
eight percentage point increase in the ARM share. Studying these diﬀerent risk premium measures
also reveals interesting diﬀerences. In the last ten years of our sample, only the rule-of-thumb
continues to predict the ARM share. We track the poorer performance of the forecasters-based
measure down to large forecast errors in future short rates. We show that these forecast errors are
not present in the inﬂation risk premium component of the bond risk premium. We use real yield
data and inﬂation forecasts to construct the inﬂation risk premium and show that it has strong
predictive power for the ARM share. This exercise lends further credibility to a theory of strategic
mortgage timing by households.
In a previous version of the paper, we have also studied the UK. Fixed rate mortgages are a
lot less prevalent in the UK than in the US, and only a recent addition to the market. So, while
the maturity choice may be somewhat less relevant, we still found a similar positive covariation
between the ARM share and the bond risk premium. This implies that the link that we document
between bond risk premia and aggregate mortgage choice is not typical for the US mortgage market
only.
Taken together, our ﬁndings suggest that households may be making close-to-optimal mortgage
choice decisions. Capturing the relevant time variation in bond risk premia is feasible by using a
simple rule-of-thumb. This paper contributes to the growing household ﬁnance literature (Campbell
(2006)), which debates the extent to which households make rational investment decisions. Given
the importance of the house in the median household’s portfolio and the prevalence of mortgages to
ﬁnance the house, the problem of mortgage origination deserves a prominent place in this debate.
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31A Risk-Return Tradeoﬀ
This appendix computes the expected utility from time-1 and time-2 consumption for each of the contracts. We ﬁrst
compute the utility without log transformation, and only at the end, when comparing the two mortgage contracts,
reintroduce this log transformation.


























































































using the same argument as in the period-1 utility calculations.














































































In these steps, we used:
Π2 = Π1e
x1, Π1 = e
x0,
E1 (L2) = µL + ρL (L1 − µL) = µL + ρ2
L (L0 − µL) + ρLσLεL
1 = E0 (L2) + ρLσLεL
1,
e−x1 ≃ e−E0(x1) − e−E0(x1) [x1 − E0 (x1)].















































































































































The last approximation assumes that γe−x0−E0(x1) (σ′ε1)σxεx
1 is zero (a shock times a shock). (σxe′
2Rσ) is the
covariance of x and y$, where we deﬁned e2 = [0,1]′. In the third line of the approximation, we use qARM
1 ≃ y$
1(1).
Now we reintroduce the log transformation to the exponential preferences. Households prefer the ARM if and

























































































































































Simplifying Expressions The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of the inequality, i.e., the risk induced by






























































x are an order of magnitude smaller than σ2
y, which
motivates the approximation in the third line. This in turn implies that the ARM contract primarily carries real
rate risk, while, in contrast, the FRM contract carries only inﬂation risk. This is the risk-return trade-oﬀ discussed
in the main text.
Ignoring the e−E0[x1] inﬂation term, the left-hand side of above inequality is the diﬀerence in expected nominal









0 (2) − y$







where we use the approximations of Section 1.3.
B VAR with Heteroscedasticity
We now extend the VAR model to allow for heteroscedastic innovations. In particular, we allow for time-varying
volatility in the real interest rate (y) and expected inﬂation (x). Long-term expectations are unaﬀected by the
switch from homoscedastic to heteroscedastic model, so that the term structure dynamics presented before remain
identical.
We ﬁrst estimate the innovations (ˆ ηt,t = 1,...,T) from the VAR model and construct the implied innovations
to the real rate and expected inﬂation according to (20) and (21),
ηx









Next, we model both conditional variances as an exponentially aﬃne function in their own level
V x





= exp(αx + βxxt(12)), (22)
V
y






= exp(αy + βyyt(12)). (23)
The coeﬃcients αi and βi, i = x,y, are estimated consistently via non-linear least squares










− exp(αi + βiit(12))
￿2
.
The estimation delivers two time-series for 1-year ahead conditional variances for 1985-2006.6. Conditional real
rate volatility is 1.06% per year on average, while expected inﬂation volatility is three times lower at 0.35% per
year on average. There is some time variation in these one-year ahead conditional volatilities. The two conditional
volatilities co-move strongly negatively; their correlation is -0.71.
34C Derivation of the Prepayment Option Formula


























































































where we use that qARM
1 = P $
1 (1)






























with η1 and η2 orthogonal and variances given by:
Var[η1] = σ






We ﬁrst solve for the value of one call option for a general exercise price K, denoted by C0 (K):
























































The option will be exercised if and only if the following holds













































































































where we use that η1/
√
σ′Rσ is standard normally distributed. Rewriting and using that:
−2y
$
0 (2) = −y
$













































































where Φ( ) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Using the deﬁnition of x⋆, we conclude that
the option value is given by:
C0 (K) = P $























d2 ≡ d1 −
√
σ′Rσ,





































36Table 1: The ARM Share and the Nominal Bond Risk Premium
This table reports slope coeﬃcients, Newey-West t-statistics (12 lags), and R2 statistics for regressions of the ARM share on a constant
and the regressors reported in the ﬁrst column. The regressors are the τ-year nominal bond risk premium φ$
t(τ), measured in three
diﬀerent ways. We consider τ = 5 and τ = 10 years. The ﬁrst measure is based on Blue Chip forecast data (rows 1 and 2), the second
measure is based on the VAR (rows 3-6), the third measure is based on the rule-of-thumb (rows 7-8) with a 3-year look-back period.
For the VAR, we also show multiple regressions with the nominal bond risk premium, the conditional variance in the real rate, V
y
t , and
the conditional variance of inﬂation, V x
t , on the right-hand side (rows 5-6). Rows 9 and 10 show regressions of the ARM share on the
τ-one-year yield spread y$
t(τ) − y$
t(12). Rows 11 and 12 use the τ-year nominal yield, y$
t(τ), as predictor. Row 13 uses the diﬀerence
between the eﬀective 30-year FRM rate y$
t(FRM) and the eﬀective ARM rate y$
t(ARM), while row 15 uses y$
t(FRM) as independent
variable. Row 14 uses the component of the FRM-ARM spread that is orthogonal to the 10-1 Treasury bond spread. Rows 16 and 17
consider two other rules-of-thumb. Rule I takes the current FRM rate minus the three-year moving average of the FRM rate (row 16).
Rule II does the same, but for the ARM rate (row 17). In all rows, the regressor is lagged by one period, relative to the ARM share. All
independent variables have been normalized by their standard deviation. The sample is 1985.1-2006.6, except for rows 7 and 8, where
we use 1989.12-2006.6.
slope t-stat slope t-stat slope t-stat R2
1. Blue Chip φ$
t(5) 8.63 3.91 40.25
2. φ$
t(10) 8.89 4.22 42.62
3. VAR φ$
t(5) 7.73 4.16 32.21
4. φ$










t 5.72 2.77 -1.65 -0.69 2.54 0.92 40.36
7. Rule-of-thumb φ$
t(5) 7.88 7.08 71.23
8. φ$
t(10) 7.70 7.47 68.03
9. Slope y$
t(5) − y$
t(1) 0.46 0.21 0.11
10. y$
t(10) − y$
t(1) −0.66 −0.32 0.23
11. Long yield y$
t(5) 8.37 3.76 37.76
12. y$
t(10) 8.53 3.85 39.26
13. Mortgage rates y$
t(FRM) − y$
t(ARM) 8.09 3.17 35.31
14. y$
t(FRM) − y$
t(ARM) orth. 8.75 3.86 41.28
15. y$
t(FRM) 7.81 3.71 32.87
16. Other Rules-of-Thumb Rule I 6.00 3.74 22.54
17. Rule II 3.13 2.42 6.12
37Table 2: Probit Regressions of the ARM Share in Loan-Level Data
This table reports slope coeﬃcients, robust t-statistics (in brackets), and R2 statistics for probit regressions of an ARM dummy on a
constant and one or more regressors, reported in the ﬁrst column. The regressors are κ, the rule-of-thumb 5-year bond risk premium,
the loan balance at origination (Bal), the loan’s credit score at origination (FICO), the loan’s loan-to-value ratio (LTV), the long-term
interest rate (5-year Treasury yield), and the 5-1 year yield spread. The seventh column indicates when we include four regional dummies
for the biggest mortgage markets (California, Florida, New York, and Texas). All independent variables have been normalized by their
standard deviation. The sample consists of 654,368 mortgage loans originated between 1994-2006.6.
κt(36;5) y$(5) y$(5) − y$(1) Bal FICO LTV Regional dummies % correctly classiﬁed
0.43 No 69.4
[253]
-0.05 -0.05 0.17 Yes 61.7
[21] [28] [100]
0.42 -0.01 -0.08 0.13 Yes 68.8
[244] [4] [45] [72]
0.54 -0.47 -0.00 -0.15 0.16 Yes 71.6
[290] [237] [1] [71] [80]
0.65 0.43 -0.00 -0.11 0.17 Yes 70.9
[299] [206] [2] [58] [90]
38Figure 1: The Share of Adjustable Rate Mortgages in the US.
The ﬁgure plots the fraction of all newly-originated mortgages that are of the adjustable-rate type between January 1985 and June 2006.
The complementary fraction are ﬁxed-rate mortgages. The data are from the Federal Housing Financing Board and are based on the
Monthly Interest Rate Survey sent out to mortgage lenders. It covers purchase-money mortgages, but not reﬁnancings. ARMs include
hybrid mortgages that have an initial ﬁxed-interest rate payment period.
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39Figure 2: The Nominal Bond Risk Premium and the ARM Share
The ﬁgure plots the fraction of all mortgages that are of the adjustable-rate type against the left axis, and the nominal bond risk
premium against the right axis. The bond risk premium is computed as the diﬀerence between the 5-year nominal bond yield and the
average expected future nominal 1-year yield over the next ﬁve years. The forecast data are the consensus estimates of the average
3-month T-bill rate over the next year, one year from now, two, three, and four years from now. They are based on semi-annual data,
interpolated to monthly frequency.




















































5−year Bond Risk Premium
40Figure 3: Rule-of-Thumb for the Bond Risk Premium and the ARM Share.
The solid line corresponds to the ARM share in the US, and its values are depicted on the left axis. The dashed line displays the time
series of the bond risk premium that follows from the model in Section 2.4. It is computed as the diﬀerence between the 5-year yield
and the 3-year moving average of the 1-year yield. The time series runs from 1989.12 to 2006.6.








































41Figure 4: Three Measures of the Nominal Bond Risk Premium
Each panel plots the 5-year and the 10-year nominal bond risk premium. The average expected future nominal short rates that go into
this calculation diﬀer in each panel. In the top panel we use Blue Chip forecasters data. In the middle panel we use forecasts formed
from a VAR model. In the bottom panel we use adaptive expectations with a three-year look-back period.
Panel A: Using Blue Chip Data






































Panel B: Using VAR Model
































Panel C: Using Rule-of-Thumb










































42Figure 5: Correlation of Rule-of-Thumb and the ARM Share for Diﬀerent Horizons ρ.
The ﬁgure plots the correlation of bond risk premia using the rule-of-thumb (red dashed line) with the ARM share. Bond risk premia
are computed as the diﬀerence between the 10-year yield and the ρ-month moving average of short rates, i.e., κt(ρ;5). The blue bars
correspond to ρ = 24, 36, 48, 60. The red line corresponds to the correlation between the yield spread (i.e., ρ = 1) and the ARM share.
The red dashed line depicts the correlation between the 10-year yield and the ARM share (i.e., ρ = ∞). The left panel uses Treasury
yields as yield variable, while the right panel uses the eﬀective ARM and eﬀective 30-year FRM rates. The time series runs from 1989.12
to 2006.6.














































































































43Figure 6: Rolling Window Correlations
The ﬁgure plots 10-year rolling window correlations of each of the three bond risk premium measures with the ARM share. The top line
is for the rule-of-thumb measure, the middle line is for the measure based on Blue Chip forecasters data, and the bottom line is based
on the VAR. The ﬁrst window is based on the 1985-1995 data sample.


































































44Figure 7: Product Innovation in the Mortgage Market
The solid line plots our benchmark ARM share, which includes all hybrid mortgage contracts, between 1992.1 and 2006.6. The dashed
line excludes all hybrids with an initial ﬁxed-rate period of more than three years. The data are from the Monthly Interest Rate Survey
compiled by the Federal Housing Financing Board.
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45Figure 8: Errors in Predicting Future Real Rates
The ﬁgure plots forecast errors in expected future real short rates. The forecast error is computed using Blue Chip forecast data. The
average expected future real short rate is calculated as the diﬀerence between the Blue Chip consensus average expected future nominal
short rate and the Blue Chip consensus average expected future inﬂation rate. The realized real rate is computed as the diﬀerence
between the realized nominal rate and the realized expected inﬂation, which are measured as the one-quarter ahead inﬂation forecast.
The realized average future real short rates are calculated from the realized real rates. The forecast errors are scaled by the nominal
short rate to obtain relative forecasting errors. The forecast errors are based on two-year ahead forecasts.







































46Figure 9: The Inﬂation Risk Premium and the ARM Share.
The ﬁgure plots the fraction of all mortgages that are of the adjustable-rate type against the left axis (solid line), and the inﬂation risk
premium (dashed line) against the right axis. The inﬂation risk premium is computed as the diﬀerence between the 5-year nominal bond
yield, the 5-year real bond yield and the expected inﬂation. The real 5-year bond yield data are from McCulloch and start in January
1997. The inﬂation expectation is the Blue Chip consensus average future inﬂation rate over the next 5 years.














































5−year Inflation Risk Premium
47Figure 10: Price Sensitivity to Changes in the Nominal Interest Rate.
The ﬁgure plots the price sensitivities of the FRM contract with and without prepayment to the nominal interest rate, y$
0(1). The
mortgage values are determined within the model of Section 4.1. The analogous ﬁxed-income securities are a regular bond (FRM
without prepayment) and a callable bond (FRM with prepayment).




















































48Figure 11: Utility Diﬀerence Between ARM and FRM - Prepayment
The ﬁgure plots the utility diﬀerence between an ARM contract and an FRM contract without prepayment as well as the utility diﬀerence
between an ARM contract and an FRM contract with prepayment.
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49Figure 12: Eﬀect of the Rate of Time Preference
Each point in the ﬁgure corresponds to the R2 of a regression of the certainty equivalent consumption diﬀerence between an ARM
contract and an FRM contract on either the bond risk premium (solid line) or one the yield spread (dashed line). The annualized
subjective discount factor β, on the horizontal axis, is varied between 0.5 and 1. The time-series are generated from a model, which is
a multi-period extension of the model in Section 1. The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is γ = 4. The exogenous moving probability
is held constant at 1% per month.






































50Figure 13: Mortgage Originations in the US.
The ﬁgure plots the volume of conventional ARM and FRM mortgage originations in the US between 1990 and 2005, scaled by the
overall size of the mortgage market. Data are from the Oﬃce of Federal Housing Finance Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).
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